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Abstract 
 
In an increasingly competitive business conditions, companies need to leverage competencies of an entire business network in 
order to achieve competitive advantage. Supply chain network envisages how a focal firm could build a network of partners in 
fulfilling a customer demand. In this process, a focal firm leads and ensures fair play of role, responsibility, reward and risk 
sharing among all its partners. Bringing in business ecosystem configuration, one can relate how structural features of an 
industry and regulatory can impact the performance of the industry. In modern new generation, technology led and market 
oriented businesses, market forces help to align entities and focal firm commands hierarchy in both upstream and downstream 
towards common goal. If any of the partners find, the goal or reward and risk being unduly burdened, partner would opt out. 
However, there are certain traditional industries which have survived long under regulatory conditions because of its weak 
structuring, have focal firms burdened with conflicting objectives of partners. One such industry is that of manufacture of sugar 
in India which is being deregulated. However, current set of deregulatory measures are more focused on downstream linkages 
rather than upstream linkages. In this paper, author reviews different works connected with supply network and relates to 
Indian sugar industry in the context of structure and regulatory framework.  
 
Keywords: Business ecosystem; Value creation; Supply Chain; Value Network; Structure and competitiveness; Value sharing; 
Sugar Industry. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Over the last fifteen years, management literature has seen a number of works on value network, synchronized supply 
chain and conscious competition as themes which can work for sustaining growth of companies. All these nomenclature 
describes creating and sharing value among network of players. More commonly value network are believed to be 
working in technology sector, Hi-tech industries, telecommunications, banking and financial services, health care and so 
on. It may be noted here that a value chain concept propounded by Michael E.Porter (1985) has been widely used for 
analysis and strategy decision making in manufacturing and traditional businesses. Though Value chain as a tool focuses 
on value creating activity internal to the business, Porter has articulated how value chain of a firm can connect with value 
chain of a supplier and customer and create a value across network. The conceptual link between value system and 
value network needs to be deployed for strategic decision making. There is a linkage between value network and firms 
role agents in explaining the conduct and performance of the firm in an industry. In the following paragraph the definition 
of supply chain, value network and conscious competition are given to make it contextual to the paper.  
Supply chain is defined as “… network of organizations that are involved, through upstream and downstream 
linkages, in the different processes and activities that produce value in the form of products and services in the hands of 
the ultimate customer” (Christopher 1998). We could infer that there is a nodal firm which offers a product or service to 
ultimate customers at a price which is inclusive of supply chain profits. Profits are shared across the network based on 
roles, responsibility, risks and rewards.  
According to Mariotti (2002) a value network is “an interactive combination of information, machines and people”. 
Value networks create value at each node. In this, we come across how input is transformed into output at different 
stages and value gets added at each stage. It is important to note that all players in respective nodes must have normal 
costs that are comparable to the average or better than average of the industry and ensure they charge only a normal 
and fair return as they move to the next node in the supply chain network. Such a practice leads to formation of a 
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synchronized supply chain network for sustainable competitive advantage.  
We can relate this with conscious competition. Conscious or value driven business takes into consideration 
the needs of consumers, vendors, shareholders and employees. Conscious competitiveness is a business approach of 
competing in the market by providing extraordinary value to the consumer and prioritizing his needs before other factors 
of the business, say, profitability etc. Conscious competitiveness strongly relate to factors like corporate social 
responsibility, sustainability and value addition in businesses that balance financial performance with preservation of the 
social good, conscious consumerism, responsible procurement process and socially responsible investment. 
While supply chain defines transparency and objectivity to role agents, their responsibility and rewards, conscious 
competition extends the horizon to society who is a tacit player in business.  
In this article, the authors have looked into how value networks in a traditional business like sugar industry in India 
where network operate is backwardly integrated. The network survives because of conscious competition and strategic 
alignment of firms taking leadership in evolving the industry. Unlike a competitive and free market forces operating in an 
industry where there is a larger scope for strategists to deploy interventions for better value creation across the network, 
in a regulated and large supplier participating in its economy it becomes complex. A sense of consciousness is more to 
be trigger and instilled across the network partners for survival of the system. 
 
2. Problem Statement 
 
1. Many times, value creation and appropriation are not synchronized as the intervening players are seemingly 
carrying divergent objectives. In such a case, value networks may be difficult to sustain.  
2. Linkages are natural either because of autonomous systems’ decision making or due to emergent strategies 
pursued by the focal firm. A focal firm is one around which the entire network is built. In the context of supply 
chain network, it is manufacturer or service provider to the customer and other nodes are linked towards the 
purpose of creating value to the customer. It is important to note here that whether it is natural / autonomous 
creation of the value network or created through an emergent strategic intent, a value network has to survive 
on merits of business proposition. Those which are created through emergent strategies are obviously had to 
be market driven. There are certain instances where in specific industries network creation is driven by 
regulations¸ limited resource deployment and the need to make group decision rather than independent 
economic decisions. These are what we call forced or compulsive value networks that are fragile and open to 
exploitation.  
In this paper, we will discuss an industry where value networks are natural and autonomous. There is need to 
emphasize even in such a business there is need to ensure that the players in the value network have reasonable pay 
offs that justifies their survival and growth. In India sugar is one such industry that has been regulated over long years on 
price and distribution, licensing and so on. The design and implementation of policies ensure that creation of value 
network and autonomous survival of firms and vertical quasi integration of ownership is near impossible because of 
certain land measures implemented in the early 1970s. 
 
3. Study Objectives 
 
1. To relate regulatory framework and structure of sugar of industry in India 
2. To map the supply chain / value network of manufacture of sugar and its byproducts 
3. To understand value network through financial performance of the industry and study whether focal firms are 
able to achieve reasonable return.      
 
4. Research Design and Methods 
 
This study is primarily an exploratory study on “Value Networks and Conscious Competition” where authors have looked 
into available literature for clarity on application of concept of value network along with other commonly used 
nomenclature in explaining supply network or business ecosystem. The nature of the industry is characterized by diverse 
interest groups working with complex network of relationships. Thus, by choosing an exploratory research as the design 
for conceptual understanding, authors wanted to validate the implications of value network and conscious competition in 
an industry which was operating under varying degree of regulatory management over years and now tending towards 
market driven industry. Using industry level published data from authentic sources; authors here applied analytical 
framework method for inferring rationale of Value network and conscious competition at an industry level. This has 
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greater scope for being applied in similar industry analysis framework across regions and industries. 
 
5. Literature Review 
 
5.1 Value Creation and appropriation 
 
The purpose of any business enterprise from single firm’s point of view is to create value. Firms have recognized the 
need for building networks that leverage resources not owned by a firm; in order to create sustainable competitive 
advantage. Value appropriation is important for firm’s growth and survival. Though value creation and value appropriation 
process is interlinked, many times both are not synchronized as the intervening players have seemingly divergent 
objectives. Before defining frame work for value creation and appropriation one needs to understand changing business 
models, industry characteristics, and firm’s relationships with other network members across value network.  
 
5.2 Changing Business Models: 
 
Businesses, especially in traditional industries were self - reliant and inward looking with growth either through forward or 
backward integration. Firms believed in investing and creating their own assets. Size, volumes and scales of geographic 
distribution were the parameters that determined the strength of an organization in the market place. Today businesses 
are increasingly challenged by one or more of the following situations: saturation in the markets, breakthroughs in 
technology that shake up the status quo, cheaper and better alternatives and demand for value addition from the 
members of the value chain. This has necessitated revisiting the existing business models. The internet and 
developments in the field of information and communication technologies (ICTs) have made it possible to develop and 
operate systems that are transparent and seamless. Firms have redefined boundaries by making alliances with those 
players outside of their industry taking advantage of “open” /public assets like the internet. Businesses are also evolving 
to be more creative, flexible and creating new knowledge and expertise to create and deliver new products and services. 
Heterogeneous industries are increasingly converging for new product creation and service delivery. Such aggregation of 
new business models and blurring of boundaries across industries have led to emergence of new revenue models.  
Traditional businesses also have compulsions of creating networks for value creation and sustain competition. For 
example, power engineering company which is in the business of manufacturing power equipment like pressure boilers 
and turbine can compete only if it creates a seamless supply chain where suppliers and ancillary units along with auxiliary 
equipment manufacturers form a value network. These firms also need to work on changing business model where they 
may have to involve partners from bidding stage to do concurrent engineering. Trust and ability to forge alliance 
relationship is what can reduce lead time and cost for achieving competitiveness.  
While competition was the key element, collaboration, co-operation and co-evolution were discussed as important 
factors for building long term strategies for businesses. The term co-opetition introduced by Brandernburger and Nalebuff 
(1996) is based on the concept of applying a variant of game theory to strategic issues. According to them, a successful 
business strategy involves a ‘value net’ approach that comprises not only competitors but also the customers, suppliers 
and complementary firms of its business. To quote them, “Co-opetition recognizes that business relationships have more 
than one aspect. As a result, it can occasionally sound paradoxical. But this is part of what makes co-opetition such a 
powerful mindset. It’s optimistic, without being naive. It encourages bold action, while helping you to escape the pitfalls. It 
encourages a firm to adopt a benevolent attitude towards other players, while at the same time keeping the firm tough-
minded and logical. By showing the way to new opportunities, co-opetition stimulates creativity”. Porter in his cluster 
theory has articulated how horizontally and vertically firms are able cooperate among competing firms and also with 
network partners like suppliers and distributors in a geographical cluster for achieving economic growth. Ancarani and 
Shankar (2003) also reveal similar phenomena in convergent industries. According to them, the emergence of new forms 
of hybrid competition that include competition and cooperation drive the need for the right strategic alliances in 
convergent industries. The strategic ability to setup and run value networks with partners like competing firms, supporting 
firms, suppliers and even customers is key to success in convergent industries. The focus of strategic management must 
be network of firms and not resource based view or any other structural view. They further state that managers face two 
key strategic challenges when competing in convergent industries: 1 maintaining focus on customer relationships; and 2. 
Identifying partners for strategic alliances and managing the alliances, often collaborating with competitors in traditional 
industries. Though the above inference especially towards customer relationships could be true for market driven 
industries, it is important to note there are other set of traditional industries which may also have to modified with broader 
social perspective in a resource based regulated industries. This would be focused in this paper. It may be noted here 
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that business ecosystem models and network models are modular forms that are developed from collaborative theories. 
 
5.3 Ecosystem model 
 
Business ecosystems derive their meaning and essence from ecosystems existing in nature. An ecosystem is a place 
that has numerous living things in perfect balance. Business ecosystems gained acceptance and popularity after it was 
first proposed by James F. Moore (1993). The concept of ecosystem replaces competition with co-evolution, wherein 
stakeholders, potential competitors and governmental institutions work together to create a better future for all the 
members of the ecosystem. James F Moore (1996 & 2006) suggests that the core of a business ecosystem consists of 
core products, complementary products, leading firms, complementing firms, competitors, customers and suppliers 
interacting with each other. Brandenburger and Nalebuff (1996) have proposed a similar thought in terms of ‘value net’. 
Business ecosystems have been described as “meta-markets”, “virtual clusters” and as “C-Commerce”. Other terms that 
are used to describe the overlapping meanings of business ecosystems are co-opetition, value net and value 
constellation.  
 
5.4 Network Models 
 
Literature on network theory is replete with comprehensive reviews of networks and their governance. Network models 
illustrate a wide array of relationships ranging from the dyadic and simple relationship between the buyer and seller to 
complex networks. Strategic alliances involving relationship between two firms to derive mutual benefit in one or more 
business functions gained importance. An alliance may be seen as the ‘joining of forces and resources, for a specified or 
indefinite period, to achieve a common objective’. NTT DOCOMO, INC. (DOCOMO) and Tata Teleservices Limited 
(TTSL) are in a strategic alliance, to expand mobile communication operations in the fast-growing Indian mobile market. 
Star Alliance among many airline operators is another classic example which has been operating successfully over 
decades. Strategic alliance is the name given to a form of corporate structure in which a number of organizations link 
together, usually by taking small stakes in each other and as a result of having a close business relationship, often as 
suppliers to each other.  
The network structure is a way to defuse the traditionally adversarial relationship between buyers and suppliers. 
Chrysler adopted the keiretsu model resulting in the company’s relationship with its suppliers, reducing in number from 
2,500 in 1989 to 1,140 in 1996, and improving of relationships between the firms to such an extent, that Dyer claimed “the 
two sides now strive together to find ways to lower the costs of making cars and to share the savings” (Dyer, 1996). 
Here, one may relate network to supply chain. Success of each firm in the value chain depended not only on its 
own performance but also on the strength of the linkage and the interaction between all the firms in the chain. 
Competition then shifted from inter-firm to inter - value networks. The result was that strategic alliances were not confined 
to just two firms but went on to include more firms.  
Network organization followed supply chain management thinking. Several authors observed that a variety of 
industries created their own networks. And network governance coordination was largely by informal social systems 
rather than formal, bureaucratic structures within firms and formal contractual arrangements between firms to coordinate 
complex products or services in unpredictable and competitive environments (Piore and Sabel, 1984; Powell, 1990; Ring 
and Van de Van, 1992; Miles, Snow, and Coleman, 1992). Network governance involves a select, persistent, and 
structured set of autonomous firms as well as not-for-profit agencies engaged in creating products or services based on 
implicit and open-ended contracts to adapt to environmental contingencies and to coordinate and safeguard exchanges 
(Jones et.al 1997). Network organizations have been observed globally in a variety of industries including 
semiconductors, biotechnology, film music, financial services, courier services, fashion designing and even in the field of 
education. 
While individual firms compete and bargain for more space, the emphasis is on the overall well-being of the 
ecosystem. Prahalad and Hamel (1990) advocated the exploitation of core competencies, later models emphasized value 
creation through ‘share of the customer’ approach by putting together several competencies to address the needs of the 
customer.  
According to Mariotti (2002) a value network is “an interactive combination of information, machines and people”. 
Value networks are concentrated in creating value in each node. Value network is not seen as bound to certain region - it 
can even be global. The concept of industry is included in the discussion of value network, but companies inside a Value 
network can be parts of different industries. Value network and business ecosystem are not based on geographic 
aspects. It is a co-operative structure. The members’ tasks are strictly defined and generally not expected to compete 
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with other members. The whole idea of value network arises from a notion that a single firm cannot produce the whole 
product by itself and needs other firms with different capabilities to complement the product.  
Having discussed about ecosystem, supply network and value network and how firms can align to create value for 
customers and share appropriately, it could be important to understand on failure of ecosystem or value networks.  
Differences in perception, inability to communicate the benefits to the network partners, network partners’ fear of 
cannibalization, failure to innovate, market myopia towards innovations and inability to reach higher scale of operation are 
likely factors for failure. 
The peculiarity of Indian ecosystems is that a number of participants in the ecosystem are from the unorganized 
sector and are not governed by regulations. However these members get to engage with formal, organized segments 
such as corporations and associations, thereby creating unique ecosystems. They get to be mentored by formal 
corporations and trade associations. Predominance of players from the organized sector in creation of social capital and 
appropriate mentoring for partners are important to avoid bias in value distribution. 
 A company looking to build an ecosystem needs to focus on its own core competencies because these elements 
are what make the company attractive to other potential members of an ecosystem. In the business ecosystem, 
relationships are interdependent and a firm can benefit from it without being a leader. Great partners are more conducive 
than many partners. The relationships between members of an ecosystem are rarely one - on - one. As in diplomacy, a 
firm in an ecosystem needs to consider how its dealings with one partner might affect others within its group. Here unity 
gives considerable strength. 
The network phenomenon is in four ways as internal, vertical, inter market and opportunity network. In a 
knowledge society with dynamic industries, the task is to create organizations that are maximally open to the environment 
and can seek a state of more or less continuous adaptation to the non-static environment. These knowledge firms have 
weak hierarchies, dense lateral connections, low departmental walls and openness to environment. In the case of vertical 
network model, the focal organization does the ‘integrator’ role and manufactures only a few components. Nike and Cisco 
follow this model and energy is rather diverted to coordination and customer relationship. The third one inter market 
synergy aims to have business that can help each other and benefit.  
In the present business environment, firms are endeavoring to discover ways to survive, compete and succeed in 
their businesses. The value chain concept (Porter, 1980; Porter, 1985) that has been used for over three decades to 
understand and analyze industries is less applicable now thanks to the loosening of the linkages along the value chain 
and products and services becoming highly dematerialized (Normann and Ramirez, 1994; Parolini, 1999; Hakansson and 
Snehota, 1989; Campbell and Wilson, 1996). This phenomenon has been noted in a variety of sectors such as banking, 
insurance, telecommunications, new entertainment, music, advertising and certain areas of the public sector ( Li and 
Whalley, 2002; Evans and Wurster, 2000). Blurred physical dimensions of the value chain have paved the way for co-
operative behaviour and inter-firm associations have become critical in strategy formulation (Madhavan et al., 1998). 
Adoption of a network perspective is the alternative to value chain in the current model of business, particularly for those 
organizations where both the product and supply and demand chain is digitized (Peppard and Rylander, 2006). In the 
network approach, while the firms in the network are independent, the focus is not on the company or the industry but the 
value-creating system itself, within which different economic actors – supplier’s partners, allies, and customers – work 
together to co-produce value. Success of a network depends on proper definition of role, responsibility, risk and reward 
among participants which is being well articulated and executed by the focal firm. 
However, business ecosystem is an emerging concept for strategic decision making. Formation of cooperatives as 
in the case of AMUL and Campco are illustrations of ecosystem creation. The strong interlinkage of the players in an 
ecosystem compels the survival of each firm to be coupled with that of the overall business ecosystem. Cooperative 
movement in India has a long standing contribution in the growth of business and agriculture. Besides, the cooperative 
approach has also seen success in natural resource management. It is observed in agricultural resources that include 
agricultural product, milk and milk products, fisheries, and horticultural products that cooperative system plays a crucial 
role in the production and marketing which in turn support a large number of families engaged in the production of these. 
A success in marketing of these products percolates to enhanced production and hence income of the families engaged 
in the production process. A successful cooperative system (especially in these products) require a winning combination 
of financing, marketing strategy and most importantly an institutional structure that enables large participation of the 
producers on a sustainable basis. There are ample examples of successful cooperative systems available in Indian 
context including the well-known AMUL movement of Gujarat in milk production. Besides, one can also observe instances 
of success in sugar cooperatives, fisheries etc. Yet another popular cooperative movement in India is the Central Areca 
nut and Cocoa Marketing and Processing Co-operative Limited (CAMPCO). 
To summarize, there are number of works which supports value network, supply chain network and business 
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ecosystem that a focal firm while creating value to customers anchors the network along with partners with clear 
objectives and governance mechanism. Else, systems may have natural limitations and realignment could happen. 
However, we feel that there could be considerations in traditional industries where a network could be aligned more 
because non-market factors and other tacit support which neutralizes the economic disadvantage in the system. 
 
6. Analysis 
 
6.1 Structure of the industry and Regulatory 
 
Structure of the industry relates to the framework or organization of industry forces which includes mainly producers, 
consumers, regulatory and other players in the business ecosystem who collectively influence the industry in terms of its 
competitive behavior and performance. Some of the structural features are analyzed below: 
i. India is one of the largest consumers of sugar in the world. India consumes around 22.8 million tonnes of 
sugar as of 2013. Per capita sugar consumption is about 19 kilo compared to the global per capita of 24 kilo. It 
may be noted here that large part of consumption is by bulk consumers. This would include: food industry 
which is largely dominated by unorganized sector and in organized sector by beverage and pharmaceuticals 
industry. At an estimated 4 per cent compound annual growth rate in consumption, demand for sugar in India 
is expected to be around 30 - 31 million tonnes by 2020 (ISMA). Clearly, demand is firm and stable. It may 
also be noted here that the demand of sugar is politically sensitive as calories demand of low income group in 
India is met by sugar consumption. 
ii. After having discussed demand, structure of the industry depends upon supply conditions as well. Supply is 
domestic production and net of foreign trade. It may be observed from the table 1 that the sugar production 
which was 20.1 million tons in 2002-03 touched a low of 12.7 million tons in 2004-05 but peaked at 28.4 million 
tons on 2006-07. It was around 25 million tons by 2012-13.  
 
Table 1: Sugar: Production, Trade and Net Availability in India 
 
(Million tons)
Year Production Imports Exports Availability 
2002-03 20.1 0.1 1.8 18.4 
2003-04 13.5 0.6 0.3 13.8 
2004-05 12.7 2.1 0 14.8 
2005-06 19.3 1.1 18.2 
2006-07 28.4 1.7 26.7 
2007-08 26.4 5.0 21.4 
2008-09 14.5 2.4 0.2 16.7 
2009-10 18.9 4.1 0.2 22.8 
2010-11 24.4 2.6 21.8 
2011-12 26.3 3.4 22.9 
2012-13 25.1 0.35 24.75 
2013-14 (Est.) 25.0 25.0 
Std.dev 5.49 4.17 
Coefft.Var 25.87 20.26 
 
Source: ISMA November 2013 
 
Production is volatile and trade to some extent tries to support local availability. It may be noted that the volatility is high 
as seen from standard deviation and coefficient of variation data given in the table. The government has been managing 
through release management by controlling releases and stock help to balance shortfall in production. However, with 
release regulation being withdrawn it is going to be onus on the industry to allow market forces to manage the same. 
Such volatility will have an impact on firm performance as well as on managing supplier relationship by way of payment to 
cane farmers. This further gets complicated with central and state government intervening on cane price fixation to 
protect farming community. Thus, a constituent of supply network gets a supposedly “preferential” treatment to protect the 
industry. Before exploring further on balancing of supply network, let us discuss a few other parameters which affect 
sugar production. 
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There are three parameters namely sugar recovery from cane, cane yield per hectare of land and competitive use 
of cane for manufacture of sweeteners like sugar, Gur and Khandsari in India. 
On sugar recovery, it may be observed that on average on All India basis, sugar recovery is around 10 per cent as 
of 2012-13. It was at a peak of 10.6 per cent 2007-08. The lowest ever in the last 32 years is about 9.4 per cent in 1995-
96. However, it may be noted that every 0.1 per cent is significant in challenging the supply conditions. Further, though 
we consider that it has stabilized at around 10.2 per cent in India, there is a wide fluctuations across regions and even 
within East and West Uttar Pradesh. We may classify into two zones as high recovery and low recovery regions and 
variation around one per cent. Though cane price is linked to recovery, it is not a balancing factor rather a tool for 
incentives which by design challenges supply network. This is mainly because of agro climatic conditions which facilitate 
ideal recovery between January to March whereas average would be stretched because of better cane pricing during a 
previous year deficit. Thus, recovery in India affects supply network and focal firms namely sugar companies are at a 
disadvantage. 
Cane yield per hectare in India has been on an average around 70 tons (Table 2). This has been almost stabilized 
with occasional drop by about 7 to 8 per cent on a long cycle, say 10 years. The concern is with productivity being limited 
farmers could meet growing demand for income only from sugarcane price increases. Further, cane availability is going to 
be a limiting factor in years ahead. From supply network perspective, farmers’ land being available and increasingly made 
productive is what could be critical. Land productivity increase is a significant challenge in India. 
On availability of cane for manufacture of sugar, about 65 per cent is used for the same. Gur takes over 20 per 
cent and 12 per cent goes for seed cane. It is important to note here any additional cane for manufacture for sugar cane 
comes manufacture of gur but unlikely as coefficient of variation for both sugar and gur is similar. Moreover, gur is 
consumed by low income and below poverty line consumers as it is a low priced substitute for sugar. Hence, cane 
availability for sugar would be challenging and dramatic change is unlikely to happen. 
 
Table 2: Utilization of cane for manufacture of sugar and its substitutes 
 
Cane for production of
Year Area Yield Production Sugar Khandsari Gur Seed 
Mha MT/ha MMT MMT MMT MMT MMT 
2000-01 4.32 69.35 299.32 176.65 11.00 75.75 35.92 
2001-02 4.41 67.09 295.95 180.32 10.50 69.62 35.51 
2002-03 4.52 63.58 287.38 194.33 9.50 49.07 34.49 
2003-04 3.94 59.39 233.86 132.51 10.00 63.29 28.06 
2004-05 3.66 64.74 237.08 124.77 9.50 74.36 28.45 
2005-06 4.20 66.93 281.17 188.67 8.50 50.26 33.74 
2006-07 5.15 69.03 355.52 222.00 10.00 80.86 42.66 
2007-08 5.06 68.81 348.18 249.91 7.00 49.49 41.78 
2008-09 4.44 64.19 285.02 145.00 6.50 99.32 34.20 
2009-10 4.18 70.01 292.30 185.55 6.50 65.17 35.08 
2010-11 4.89 70.09 342.38 240.00 7.50 53.79 41.09 
2011-12 5.04 71.66 361.03 257.00 7.00 53.70 43.32 
2012-13 5.06 67.38 341.20 251.50 7.00 41.75 40.94 
2013-14 5.12 67.74 346.81 242.00 8.00 55.19 41.62 
2014-15 5.03 69.80 350.81 245.43 6.50 56.78 42.10 
Average 4.60 67.32 310.53 202.38 8.33 62.56 37.26 
Std.dev 0.48 3.19 42.15 45.32 1.61 15.21 5.06 
CV 10.5 4.7 13.6 22.4 19.3 24.3 13.6 
 
Source: CRISIL Research, 2014 
 
Thus, the upstream linkages of supply network in sugar industry are quite challenging. Whether it is regulated or some of 
the challenges are more because of the nature of demand and supply side factors. These challenges are likely to 
continue. 
iii. On regulatory aspects, the industry had been under price and distribution control on the downstream side of 
supply network and on the upstream, it had controls on minimum cane price to be paid to farmers and location through 
licensing and minimum distance criteria between two factories. Till April 2013, sugar sales were controlled by levy sugar 
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to be sold below market price, release mechanism for sale on monthly basis, control on exports and imports and need to 
pack in jute bags. Post April 2013, levy sugar and release mechanism have been done away with. This would link 
downstream with market forces. Further changes in downstream include removal of quantity and time based export – 
import control and limiting it to tariff policy and reducing jute bags mandatory bagging to 40 per cent of output. Though the 
recommendation by expert committee (Rangarajan) included: dispensing with “minimum distance criteria”, removal of 
controls on molasses, easing out surplus power selling to grid and complete removal of need to pack in jute bags. 
Said these, regulatory framework has led to fragmentation of the industry. The sugar manufacturer who is the focal 
firm in the supply network was more saddled with managing the network through regulatory rather than market forces. 
iv. There are more than 600 factories. It may be noted that most of the plants in India are of 2500 tons of cane 
crushed in a day (tcd). Over the years, some of the factories increased the capacity to 5000 tcd of size. This required 
additional land to be allotted in the command area and both central and state governments to give approvals for various 
aspects. More importantly, many firms sought to get a new license rather than adding capacity and increasing normal 
size. This is mainly because new license gave more quota to be sold in open market. Thus, policy framework limited the 
supply network by reducing normal size to 2500 tcd and as on date average size in India is around 3750 tcd whereas the 
expert committee recommends optimal size for a sugar factory to be 5000 tcd. International standards are further high at 
7500 tcd.  
It may be further noted here how normal size could limit supply network synchronized flow of product, information 
and financial flows. A large size plant, say 5000 tcd facilitates for co-generation of power and better realization for cane 
procured. Efficiency improvements are aplenty. Thus, supply network constraint is further imposed on location and facility 
sizing along with scope for joint and by products. 
Another structural perspective is that of ownership where Indian sugar industry is largely owned by farmer 
cooperative societies which are run by professional managers. There is a large agency problem due to owners and 
trustees priorities. Internal supply chain efficiencies are affected as many times decisions could be suboptimal because of 
conflicts between owners and professional managers. Thus, structural analysis of sugar industry in relation to its value 
network shows limitation on design, objectives and lack of role clarity impacting performance. To validate the same, we 
would map the supply chain as below and relate performance of the industry. 
 
6.2 Supply chain Network 
 
Based on the discussions above, we present the following supply / value network partners in sugar industry. 
Key Node in the network: Firm manufacturing sugar referred to as thefocal firm. 
Role: Focal firm who initiates and owns the value network 
Responsibility: Manufacture sugar by procuring cane in the command area. Incidentally, joint products & by 
products like power, bagasse, molasses & Press mud and forward integration for industrial / potable alcohol. 
Reward: Earn that rate of return on capital employed which compares with the market and attract further capital to 
create additional capacity to meet demand. 
Risk: Business which consists of operating risk (measured by variability in EBITDA reflecting revenue or cost 
management), financial risk measured by debt – equity which is high because of stock to be held and portfolio risk of 
businesses run by the firm in terms of joint & by products. A focal firm in this industry carries high operating and financial 
risk which is against normal practice in a market lead business. 
Upstream Node in the network: Cane farmers supplying to the focal firm 
Role: Supplier of cane to the factory as land located in demarcated area of development under the factory. Follows 
best practices as advised and supported by the focal firm. 
Responsibility: Supply cane with a right to exercise choice to be part of the value network. Reward: Benefit 
competitive crop income with the support of firm in improving physical performance and get better realization of revenue 
with price fixed by the government and paid by the focal firm. 
Risk: Business which consists of operating risk of focal firm not procuring cane on time especially during surplus 
cane production due to environmental factors, and financial risk measured by debt raised for cane production or mainly 
due to delayed payment of cane prices by the firm. A firm would not have paid as they got into a financial distress 
because of poor price realizations. However, downstream farmers face more of cash flow timing issue as cane price are 
politically influenced because of group bargaining power and at times their agricultural loans being waived as a policy 
decision. Though this works as an indirect subsidy in support of sugar consumers, private factory owners would not 
benefit out of this. 
Downstream Node in the network: Dealers – Retailers - Consumers channel  
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Role: Retail consumers who buy sugar of the focal firm which a dealer triggers the sale by connecting the firm and 
a local agent and then through to retailers. Physical flow management is till sugar reaches customers. 
Responsibility: Dealer is mainly a broker who aggregates retail order and delivers after picking up from the factory. 
All the constituents here work for a margin. Customer looks for appropriate price at which he can buy a required quantity 
of sugar. 
Reward: Fair price and adequate quantity to buy is what the customer expects. Since there was a regulated 
release mechanism and levy price, the consumers were insulated from volatility in price and availability. Now that the 
regulatory mechanism has been withdrawn, we may have to observe a couple of years to understand how it works. 
Theoretically, market forces must drive for better value, though consumers may end up paying a premium which was 
absorbed as cost of protection by the government.  
Risk: In the regulated regime retail consumers were well protected. Sugar price in the price index grew at 3 per 
cent over a midterm period of five years whereas overall index had gone by 7 per cent and food articles price had much 
higher rise. However, one would expect that though once market forces have started operating since April 2013, prices 
have been stable, and one has observe outcome during deficit sugar year which is unlikely in the current year as well. As 
of now, consumers are enjoying low price risk. This is further to the fact that India is the consumption and supply centre. 
And if there is deficit in supply which could affect price, it can be supported by an import from Brazil. However, when 
international market senses deficit in India, price has a tendency to firm up. Thus, consumer market price risk is limited. 
Downstream Node in the network: Direct supply to institutional buyers  
Role: Institutional consumers like drug manufacturers, beverages and others who use large quantity of sugar as 
ingredient buy sugar of the focal firm directly on ex-factory basis . 
Responsibility: Institutional buyers are the major node in supply network. Though in India, data breakup is not 
exactly available in open source, according to ISMA it could be around 65 per cent. But this would include institutional 
consumers who buy through dealers as well which are not part of direct channel. We would focus on direct channel 
buyers here who buy the same product as others. 
Reward: Fair price is to be set as the reward. Till now, they buy as part of open quota and it is market based 
pricing. However, our view is that the pricing must be differentiated based on value creation as product application and 
value as intermediary is high. It is not appropriate that they benefit out of market imperfection. It may sound theoretical at 
this point but would set under free market conditions as sugar mills will also have compulsions in fulfilling their 
differentiated markets in open market condition in an economy when regulation is withdrawn. Since it is just about 18 
months after withdrawal of distribution control, the carry over stock is available as a Cushion for balancing price. The real 
effect would be seen as we move on a full sugar cycle of lean and surplus seasons in a deregulated environment. 
Risk: As mentioned above, price risk is the major key which would be more appropriately understood when full 
scale deregulation of distribution control is operational. As of now, institutional buyers are guided by market price based 
on largely dealer market conditions. 
Impact of Support System node is as follows: 
i. We discussed in detail about role of central government. It fixes the statutory minimum price (SMP) for cane. 
Since this is not linked to output price, it distorts the value / supply network. Neither market forces operate the 
industry nor do partners appreciate trust factor for long term survival and growth. It is important the transition 
initiated must settle for market forces and there would be some shake outs which must be tolerated for overall 
interest of the economy. This is more in tune with winds of change towards deregulation and business like 
orientation towards agriculture and on agro based industries. 
ii. ii. State Governments play a major role especially in sugarcane dominant states as political stakes are high. 
This gets complicated with populist approach of regional parties and because of coalition politics fueling state 
governments’ such ambitions. State government must avoid intervening and should only be a facilitator. The 
original idea of State Advised Price (SAP) was a role of facilitator in adjusting SMP to more realistic towards 
local conditions like yield and competitive cropping. This must be allowed for the market forces to decide. 
iii. Firms which have set up cogeneration of power are able to export. Policy need to be consistent across states 
and pricing must be fair. More importantly, because of inefficiencies of some of the electricity boards payments 
are being delayed which again hurts the industry. From value network perspective, joint product has a poor 
value network system which impinges the main industry namely sugar. 
Thus, in the value network, firms operate for earning market returns on their investment. Cane farmers as vendors 
are protected by minimum price policy but suffer on cash flows because of poor financial viability of mills and till recently 
output price was guided by open market conditions. Each node has conflicting objectives. It leads to interesting question 
on understanding the industry financial performance over the years. If the focal firm is not earning a market return, 
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business ecosystem may be fragile and realignment would happen as other participants in the system would suffer either 
receiving low return or mismanaged as flow timing. 
 
6.3 Financial Performance of Sugar Industry: 
 
It can be observed from the table 3 that the industry earns a poor net margin and return on capital employed which is on 
average less than 5 per cent. Drop in production and stock use ratio as can be observed from macro data is what helping 
the industry to earn a high return. For example, when stock to use came down to 11 per cent and product nearly dropped 
by 45 per cent in the year 2008-09, performance looked attractive. But that was not sustainable as raw material cost as 
percentage of sales went up significantly and sustained at that level. Thus, increase in cane price and poor market 
realization for output price as can be seen from sugar price data makes the value/supply network less synchronized. It 
may further be noted that creditors’ days are higher showing inability to pay on time. Further, finished goods inventory 
days are as high as 146 days and on an average about 120 days which highlights pressure to carry stocks. All such 
parameters would affect financial performance and increases business risk. If such burden can be shared proportionately 
across the chain, then one could appreciate synchronized network being in operation. 
 
Table 3: Sugar Industry financials and macro data 
 
Unit 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 20011-12 2012-13 
Operating profit margin Per cent 14 20.2 14.1 11.6 11.2 12.5 
Net profit margin Per cent -0.1 11.4 3.4 0.2 -0.9 1.4 
Return on capital employed Per cent 5.5 14.9 7.5 6.7 5.5 8.1 
Interest coverage ratio times 1.6 3.4 2.5 1.6 1.4 1.8 
Debt equity ratio times 2.3 1.5 1.9 2 2 2 
Current ratio times 2.2 2.3 2.3 3 3.2 2.9 
Finished goods days 120 104 121 109 126 146 
Debtor days days 23 21 21 22 29 26 
Creditors days days 119 138 138 64 81 100 
Raw material cost as % of sales Per cent 67.7 63.6 72 75.4 75.8 74.3 
Macro data: 
Average sugar price Rs. Per tonne 15,142 22,787 30,774 28,107 30,848 32,420 
Sugar production million tonnes 26.4 14.5 18.9 24.5 26.2 24.8 
Sugar consumption million tonnes 22 23 21 22.1 22.9 23.7 
Exports million tonnes 5 0.2 0.2 2.7 3.2 0 
Imports million tonnes 0 2.5 4.2 0 0 0.3 
Closing stock million tonnes 8.6 2.5 4.4 4.2 4.3 5.7 
Stock-to-use ratio per cent 32 11 21 17 16 24 
 
Source: CRISIL, Oct, 2013. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
It is observed from this paper that supply / value network across sugar industry is poorly structured because of divergent 
goals across the chain and inability of the focal firms to manage and control node agents. Buyers and suppliers’ 
bargaining power supported by regulatory framework have eroded value creation of the industry. Often, the ecosystem 
participants are wrapped up in conflict and litigation because the regulations are neither consistent nor market centric. 
Industry needs to be market oriented. Location and size inefficiencies will have to go as normal size must move up to 
5000 tcd and above. Also, joint and by products must be allowed to be managed better so that value realization is 
improved and cross subsidization must help reduce business risk instead of increasing it. That would incentivize firms to 
restructure and make inorganic moves for the benefit of the industry. The government must think radically, perhaps, even 
allowing asset restructuring of cooperatives and improving governance whereby they can partner with others to bring in 
private capital. This industry like many traditional ones, have supply networks operating rather inefficiently and choking 
because of write-offs and subsidies instead of improving market efficiencies. All stakeholders must appreciate the role of 
focal firm in running its business and eco system must facilitate the same. 
 
ISSN 2039-2117 (online) 
ISSN 2039-9340 (print) 
        Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences 
            MCSER Publishing, Rome-Italy 
Vol 6 No 1 
January  2015 
          
 489 
References 
 
Christopher, Martin, Logistics and Supply Chain Management: Strategies for Reducing Cost and Improving Service, 2nd edition. Great 
Britain: Financial Times / Prentice Hall, 1998. 
Mariotti, J.L., “The Value Network”, in Executive Excellence, Vol. 19, No. 7, 2002. 
Moore, James F., Predators and Prey: A New Ecology of Competition, Harvard Business Review. May-June 1993. 
Moore, James F., The Death of Competition. Leadership and Strategy in the Age of Business Ecosystems. John Wiley & Sons Ltd, West 
Sussex., 1996. 
Moore, James F. , Business Ecosystems and the View From the Firm. The Antitrust Bulletin, 51 (1), 2006. 
Brandenburger, A. and Nalebuff, B., Co-opetition. Published by Broadway Business, New York, 1996. 
Dyer, J.H., “How Chrysler Created an American Keiretsu”, Harvard Business Review, July–August 1996 
Piore, Michael J. and Charles F.Sabel, The Second Industrial Divide: Possibilities for Prosperity. New York, Basic Books. 1984;  
Powell Walter W, Neither Market nor Hierarchy: Network forms of Organization, Research in Organizational Behavior, Vol.12, 1990 
Ring, Peter Smith and Van de Ven, Andrew H, Structuring cooperative relationships between organizations, Strategic Management 
Journal, Volume 13, Issue 7, October 1992 
Miles, C. C., Snow, R. E., and Coleman, H. J., Jr., Managing 21st century network organizations. Organizational Dynamics 20(3): 1992. 
Jones, C., Hesterly, W. S., & Borgatti, S. P., A general theory of network governance: Exchange conditions and social mechanisms. 
Academy of Management Review, 22(4), 1997. 
C.K, Prahalad and Gary Hamel., The Core competence of the corporation, Harvard Business Review, May-June 1990. 
Porter, M.E., Competitive Strategy, Free Press, New York, 1980 
Porter, M.E. , Competitive Advantage, Free Press, New York, 1985 
Normann, R. & Ramirez, R., Designing Interactive Strategy: From Value Chain to Value Constellation. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons. 
1994. 
Parolini, C., The Value Net: A Tool for Competitive Strategy. Chichester: Wiley, 1999. 
Hakansson, H. & Snehota, I, “No Business is an Island: The Network Concept of Business Strategy”, Scandinavian Journal of 
Management, Vol 4, No. 3, 1989. 
Campbell, A.J. and Wilson, D., ``Managed networks: creating strategic advantage'', in 
Iacobucci, D. (Ed.), Networks in Marketing, Sage, London, 1996 
Li, F. in Whalley, J., Deconstruction of the telecommunicatons industry: from value chains to value networks, Telecommunications Policy 
26, 2002.  
Evans P and Wurster T S, Blown to Bits: how the new economics of information transforms strategy, Harvard Business School Press, 
Boston, USA, 2000.  
Madhavan, R., Koka, B.R. and Prescott, J.E. , “Networks in transition: how industry events (re)shape interfirm relationships”, Strategic 
Management Journal, Vol. 19 No. 5, 1998. 
Peppard J. and Rylander, A., From Value Chain to Value Network: Insights for Mobile Operators, European Management Journal, 24 (2–
3), 2006.  
Presentation made by Abinash Verma, Dirctor-General, Indian Sugar Mill Association, at ISO – London on November, 25, 2013. 
CRISIL Research, Return on Capital Employed for sugar industry, October 31 2013. 
CRISIL Research, Sugar Industry Report, 2014. 
